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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
DAVID LOYOLA, : Case No. 890436-CA 
Category No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal follows the conviction of Driving Under the 
Influence, a Class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§41-6-44 (1953 as amended). Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §77-35-26(2)(a)(1953 as amended) and Utah 
Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(c)(1953 as amended) whereby a criminal 
defendant in the circuit court may take an appeal from a judgment of 
conviction to the Utah Court of Appeals. In this case, DAVID LOYOLA 
was convicted at a bench trial before the Honorable Edward A. 
Watson, Judge, Third Circuit Court, in and for Tooele County, State 
of Utah. Judge Watson rendered final judgment and conviction 
against Loyola. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Did the trial judge err reversibly when he denied 
Defendant's motion to suppress evidence gathered from his detention 
by the police on the grounds it was not supported by reasonable 
suspicion? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Loyola was charged by Information with Driving Under the 
Influence, a Class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§41-6-44(1)(a)(1953 as amended). He was found guilty of that charge 
following a joint motion to suppress hearing and bench trial based 
on stipulated facts on May 1, 1989. Judgment and conviction was 
entered by the Honorable Edward A. Watson of the Third Circuit Court 
on June 1, 1989 and Loyola was sentenced to ninety days jail all 
suspended but two days to be satisfied by twenty-four hours of 
community service, to pay a $400.00 fine plus a $100.00 surcharge, 
$100*00 victim restitution fund fee and $150.00 in alcohol education 
costs, and to avoid any violations of the law for six months. 
Loyola's motion for a certificate of probable cause was granted by 
the trial judge and all conditions of his sentence were stayed 
pending the outcome of the appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On August 31, 1988, Henry White was working at the 
Stansbury Park Golf Shop in Tooele County. (Motion to Suppress 
Transcript (M.T. 5 at 22-25). He observed Loyola at the golf shop 
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and concluded that Loyola was drunk. (M.T. 6 at 1-3). White 
telephoned the Tooele County Sheriff's office after he observed 
Loyola drive away. (M.T. 6 at 13-15). He told the dispatcher that 
he believed the driver of the blue Mazda pick-up truck was 
intoxicated and then left his name and address with the dispatcher. 
(M.T. 6 at 16-17). White did not observe Loyola driving in an 
erratic or reckless manner. (M.T. 18 at 14-16). 
Trooper Kerwood received a radio call that someone at the 
golf shop had reported that there was an intoxicated driver in a 
blue Mazda pick-up truck with two barrels in the bed. (M.T. 6 at 
23-25). She stopped a vehicle matching the description in the radio 
call in the Stansbury Park area. (M.T. 7 at 2-3). After stopping 
Loyola, she observed he had the odor of alcohol. (M.T. 7 at 4). 
She administered three field sobriety tests and formed the opinion 
based on Loyola's performance that he was intoxicated. (M.T. 7 at 
5-9). She placed Loyola under arrest and he agreed to take an 
intoxilyzer test. (M.T. 8 at 4-5). The test was performed 
forty-five minutes later. (M.T. 9 at 4-6). The result was a .14 
blood alcohol content. (M.T. 24 at 3). 
The parties stipulated to the facts for purposes of the 
defendant's motion to suppress and the trial. (M.T. 4 at 25, 5 at 
1-2). After hearing the evidence, the trial judge found Kerwood had 
reasonable suspicion to stop Loyola and denied defendant's motion. 
(M.T. 23 at 17-20). The court further found Loyola guilty of 
Driving Under the Influence. (M.T. 24 at 5-8). 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Loyola's motion to suppress should have been granted 
because his detention was not supported by a reasonable suspicion he 
was engaged or had been engaged in criminal activity. The tip 
received by the Tooele County Sheriff's office was conclusory and 
not supported by specific, objective facts. Thus, the conviction 
should be reversed and the case remanded for suppression of evidence 
flowing from the illegal stop. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
TROOPER KERWOOD'S DETENTION OF MR. LOYOLA 
VIOLATED HIS RIGHT AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCH 
AND SEIZURE AS GUARANTEED BY THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION. 
Appellant challenged his initial detention by Kerwood. It 
is well settled that the Fourth Amendment applies to "investigatory 
stops" or "seizures" that fall short of actual arrests. State v. 
Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85 (Utah App. 1987)(citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. 1, 22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L.Ed. 889 (1968)). In this case 
the State stipulated that Kerwood stopped Mr. Loyola1s vehicle as he 
was leaving the Stansbury Park area. (M.T. 7 at 2.) Consequently, 
the trooper's actions are subject to constitutional strictures. 
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In Terry v, Ohio, 392 U.S. at 22-23, 20 L.Ed, at 906, the 
Court created an exception to the probable cause requirement of the 
Fourth Amendment. Under Terry a police officer may detain a person 
to conduct a brief investigation provided the officer possesses a 
reasonable suspicion based on objective articulable facts that a 
crime is being or has been committed. l^ d. Additionally, the tip of 
an informant may be reliable enough to create reasonable suspicion 
for a stop and frisk. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 92 S.Ct. 
1921, 32 L.Ed. 612 (1972). In Adams, the Court confronted the 
question of whether the hearsay tip of an informant justified an 
officer's frisk and seizure of a suspect. The stop was upheld 
because the officer knew the informant, the informant was subject to 
perjury charges, the information was readily verifiable and the 
neighborhood was a high crime-area. idL at 146-148, 32 L.Ed.2d 
617-618. The general rule regarding when a tip constitutes an 
articulable suspicion is that: 
Informant's tips, like all other clues and 
evidence coming to a policeman on the scene, may 
vary greatly in their value and reliability. One 
simple rule will not cover every situation. Some 
tips, completely lacking in indicia of 
reliability, would either warrant no police 
response or require further investigation before 
a forcible stop of a suspect would be authorized. 
Id. Therefore, an informant's tip may give rise to reasonable cause 
only if it has sufficient indicia of reliability. 
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In United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 105 S.Ct. 675, 83 
L.Ed. 2d 604 (1985), the Court broadened the sources which the 
government could draw on to uphold an investigatory stop. Defendant 
Hensley was stopped pursuant to a wanted flyer issued from another 
state, and as a result of the stop, the police discovered he was 
illegally in possession of a firearm. The Court reasoned that if a 
flyer or bulletin has been issued on the basis of articulable facts 
supporting a reasonable suspicion that the wanted person has 
committed an offense, then reliance on that flyer or bulletin 
justifies a stop to check identification." Ijd. at 232, 83 L.Ed.2d 
at 614. The flyer was issued based on the detailed description of 
an informant who participated in the crime and, accordingly, was 
sufficiently reliable to arouse a reasonable suspicion. Ij3. at 234, 
83 L.Ed, at 615. The Utah Supreme Court employed the Hensley 
rationale to uphold an investigatory detention based on a police 
radio broadcast. State v. Bruce, 114 Utah Adv. Rep. 5 (Utah 
1989)(broadcast placing orange car near the scene of robbery was 
supported by reasonable suspicion justifying subsequent stop). 
Applying Adams and Hensley to the instant case, the case 
turns on whether Kerwood had a reasonable suspicion based on the 
radio communication she received and the information received by the 
dispatcher prior to the stop. She did not. The parties entered 
into a stipulation of fact for purposes of both the motion to 
suppress and the trial. (M.T. 4 at 25, at 1-2). The relevant facts 
are: 
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(1) On August 31, 1988, White, an employee of the 
Stansbury Park Golf Shop, telephoned the Tooele County Sheriff's 
office to report an intoxicated driver driving away in a blue Mazda 
pick-up truck with two barrels in the back. (M.T. 5 at 22-25, 6 at 
1-3); 
(2) White left his name and address with the dispatcher. 
(M.T. 6 at 16-17); 
(3) White told the dispatcher he had suggested the driver 
get a ride home; 
(4) Kerwood received a radio call that a citizen at the 
Stansbury Park Golf Shop had reported an intoxicated driver drive 
away in a blue Mazda pick-up truck with two barrels in the back. 
(M.T. 6 at 23-25); 
(5) She stopped a vehicle matching the description of the 
call about one mile from the Stansbury Park Golf Shop. (M.T. 7 at 
2-3); 
(6) She did not observe any driving pattern before the 
stop and White did not relate one to the dispatcher. (M.T. 7 at 
2-3); 
(7) White did not tell the dispatcher the amount he saw 
Loyola drink. (M.T. 18 at 18-22). 
Based on the stipulated facts, the trial judge found that 
White was not known to be reliable. (M.T. 21 at 16-18). However, 
he also found reasonable suspicion for the stop based on the 
anonymous call because drinking drivers are so dangerous. (M.T. 
22). The court then denied the motion and found Loyola guilty of 
Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol. (M.T. 23 at 17-20). 
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The information provided to Kerwood constituted a 
conclusory allegation that Loyola was intoxicated. However, a legal 
investigatory stop must be supported by "articulated, objective 
facts" then apparent to the officer. Sandy City v. Thorsness, 115 
Utah Adv. Rep, 28, 29 (Utah App. 1989) (citing, State v. Holmes, 774 
P.2d 506 (Utah App. 1989)) . 
In Olson v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 371 N.W. 2d 552, 
556 (Minn. 1985), for example, the Minnesota Supreme Court rescinded 
the revocation of the defendant's drivers license on Fourth 
Amendment grounds because the anonymous caller failed to provide any 
specific and articulable facts to support the bare allegation of 
drunk driving. The court there noted "[if police cannot stop a car 
on the highway on the basis of mere whim, neither can they stop on 
the basis, for all they knew, of the mere whim of an anonymous 
caller.w icL Informant White did not give any specific information 
about how much Loyola drank, what his physical characteristics were, 
or how he drove, Cf. Hensley, 469 U.S. at 234, 83 L.Ed.2d at 615 
(trial court concluded that a wealth of detail concerning the crime 
reached by a culpable party created reasonable suspicion); see, 
e.g., State v. Newgard, 392 N.W. 2d 27 (Minn. App. 1986)(telephone 
tip that a drunken man was stumbling near the highway provided 
articulable facts on which to develop basis for investigatory 
stop). Moreover, White himself does not appear to have any indicia 
of reliability. He does not know what Loyola looks like sober as 
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compared to intoxicated; C£. State v. Warren, 404 N.W.2d 895 (Minn. 
App. 1987)(informant who lived with the defendant and knew he was 
drunk on this occasion was a reliable informant), nor did the state 
demonstrate that White has any familiarity with those who drink 
alcohol. Cf. State v. Lipinski, 419 N.W.2d 651 (Minn. App. 
1988)(informant was particularly reliable in identifying those under 
the influence because he was a doctor who treats alcoholics). 
The only specific fact White revealed to the police was the 
description of Loyola's car. This fact does not rise to the level 
of a reasonable suspicion that Loyola was driving under the 
influence—just that he was driving. State v. Black, 721 P.2d 842, 
846 (Or. App. 1986), supports the proposition that a tip which 
solely identifies a vehicle does not validate an otherwise illegal 
stop. 
In the instant case, the Tooele County Sheriff's office 
received a tip that had little or no indicia of reliability. 
Kerwood should have followed the advice of Adams to "further 
investigate" before making a forcible stop of a suspect. Adams at 
147, 32 L.Ed.2d 618. There is nothing in the record which 
demonstrates any particular exigency like heavy traffic or erratic 
driving by Loyola. Consequently, Kerwood's actions were not 
supported by an articulable reasonable suspicion and Loyola's motion 
to suppress should have been granted. 
- 9 -
POINT II, 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO GRANT THE MOTION 
TO SUPPRESS CONSTITUTES REVERSIBLE ERROR, 
An error requires reversal if it erodes a reviewing courts 
confidence in the outcome of the trial. State v.Knight, 734 P.2d 
913, 920 (Utah 1987). Absent the illegally obtained evidence the 
State would have had none of Kerwood's observations of Loyola's 
physical characteristics, his performance on field sobriety tests or 
the chemical blood-alcohol result. The suppression of this evidence 
would wipe out the states's case. Therefore, the error is 
reversible. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant Loyola respectfully requests that this Court 
reverse his conviction and remand his case for dismissal. 
Respectfully submitted this I day of October, 1989. 
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CERTIFICATE OP MAILING AND DELIVERY 
I, L. CLARK DONALDSON, hereby certify that eight copies of 
the foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Court of Appeals, 400 
Midelton Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 and 
four copies mailed to the Tooele County Attorney's Office, Tooele 
County Courthouse, 47 South Main Street, Tooele, Utah 84074 
this 2L day of October, 1989. 
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ADDENDUM A 
Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44(1)(a)(1953 as amended provides: 
(1) (a) It is unlawful and punishable as provided in this 
section for any person to operate or be in actual 
physical control of a vehicle within this state if the 
person has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of 
.08 grams or greater as shown by a chemical test given 
within two hours after the alleged operation or physical 
control, or if the person is under the influence of 
alcohol or any drug or the combined influence of alcohol 
and any drug to a degree which renders the person 
incapable of safely operating a vehicle. 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable 
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized. 
